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Abstract 
We use an innovative survey tool to collect management practice data from over 4,000 medium sized 
manufacturing firms across Asia, Europe and the US. These measures of managerial practice are strongly 
associated with firm-level performance (e.g. productivity, profitability and stock market value). Private Equity-
owned firms are significantly better managed than government, family and privately owned firms. Although 
they are also better managed on average than publicly listed firms with dispersed owners, this difference is not 
statistically significant. Looking at management practices in detail we find that Private Equity-owned firms have 
strong people management practices (hiring, firing, pay and promotions) but even stronger operations 
management practices (lean manufacturing, continuous improvement and monitoring). This suggests that 
Private Equity ownership is associated with broad based operational improvement in management rather than 
just stronger performance incentives. Finally, looking at changes in management practices over time, it appears 
that Private Equity targets poorly managed firms and these firms improve their management practices at a faster 
rate than other ownership types. 
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION 
Private equity (PE) ownership has become commonplace within the US and UK
1. It is also increasing 
rapidly within Continental Europe and Asia. PE-owned firms appear to generate increases in 
profitability, as documented in several studies
2. One view of this evolution is that PE ownership is 
associated with improved profitability through more effective use of debt and other financial 
instruments without any associated change in ‘real’ performance, such as greater productivity for 
ongoing business units. A second view of PE ownership is that it does enable improved firm-level 
productivity, but only through more efficient reallocations of labour and capital across plants from 
more targeted lay-offs and capital spin-outs. A third view is that PE ownership is a way to achieve 
improved management practices within firms through the introduction of new managers and better 
management practices
3. In this paper, we focus on the last claim by looking at management practices 
across 4,000 PE-owned and other firms in a sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms in Asia, 
Europe and the US
4. 
 
To implement this we first have to develop a technique to measure management practices across firms 
and countries. To do this we use a double-blind management survey developed in Bloom and Van 
Reenen [2007] to score on monitoring, targets and incentive management practices. 
 
One part of the double-blind methodology is that our interviewers are not told anything about the 
financial performance of the firms they interview. The interviewers are simply given the firms’ names 
and telephone numbers, making them ‘performance blind’ as they generally have not heard of the 
medium-sized companies we survey. The second part of the double-blind technique is that the 
managers we interview are not informed that they are being scored. To achieve this, we score 
management using a predefined practice grid provided by a leading international consultancy 
company and open-ended questions. The fact interviewers are ‘performance blind’ and managers are 
‘scoring blind’ appears to provide informative management survey data. 
 
To validate the accuracy of the scoring we carry out two pieces of analysis. First, we re-interview 222 
firms using both a different interviewer and a different plant manager at the same firm. Comparing 
these independently run interviews with the first interviews, we confirm that our management practice 
survey is consistently measuring practices within firms. Second, we match our management practice 
data to firm-level performance indicators from independently collected company accounts, such as 
productivity, profitability, sales growth and Tobin’s Q. We find that better management practices are 
strongly correlated with these independently collected firm performance measures. This is true for 
firms we interviewed from every region – the Anglo-Saxon countries (US and UK), Continental 
Europe (France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, Poland, Greece and Portugal) and Asia (China, India and 
                                                 
1 See Davis et al [2008]. They also point out that in inflation-adjusted dollars, fundraising by US PE groups was over 100 
times greater in 2006 than in 1985. PE ownership is defined as a PE firm representing the largest ownership block.  
2 See Kaplan and Schoar [2005], Muscarella and Vetsuypens [1990] or Phalippou and Gottschalg [2007]. Bebchuk and 
Fried [2004] and Schleifer and Summers [1998] offer a more skeptical view. 
3 This is the view associated with Jensen [1986, 1989] – leverage, active investors and enhanced alignment of incentives 
of managers and shareholders drive business improvements. Holstrom and Kaplan [2001] argue that although this may 
have been true in the past technological change and deregulation meant that by the late 1990s these practices have been 
more generally adopted. 
4 We focus on medium-sized firms because there is little accounting information on very small firms. Our survey method 
involves interviewing one or two plant managers, which would not be representative of very large firms that could operate 
across hundreds of plants.   3
Japan). This suggests our survey measures of management practices are robustly informative about 
firm performance. 
 
Using this new management practice data on over 4,000 firms in Asia, Europe and the US we turn to 
the analysis of the management practices in PE-owned firms. We find three broad sets of results. 
First, PE-owned firms are on average the best-managed ownership group in the sample
5. PE- owned 
firms are significantly better managed than government, family and privately owned firms. This is 
true even after controlling for a range of other firm characteristics such as country, industry, size and 
employee skills. The results also indicate that PE-owned firms have slightly 
higher management practice scores than those owned by dispersed shareholders, although the 
differences are not statistically significant. This seems consistent with Leslie and Oyer [2008], who 
found no evidence that PE-owned firms outperformed public firms in their sample of US firms 
between 1996 and 2004.  
 
Second, the main reason for the high average levels of management practices in PE-owned firms is 
the lack of any ‘tail’ of very badly managed firms under their ownership (that is, very few PE-owned 
firms are really badly managed). While government and family-owned firms, as well as firms owned 
by private individuals, have substantial ‘tails’ of badly managed firms, those owned by private equity 
appear to be all consistently well managed. 
 
Finally, disaggregating the types of management practice, it seems that PE-owned firms have strong 
people management practices, in that they adopt merit-based hiring, firing, pay and promotions 
practices. Relative to other firms, they are even better at target management practices, in that PE- 
owned firms tend to have tough targets (evaluation metrics), which are integrated across the short and 
long run, well understood by the employees and linked to firm performance. However, PE-owned 
firms are better still at operational management practices. Operational management practices include 
the adoption of modern ‘lean manufacturing’ practices, using continuous improvements and a 
comprehensive performance documentation process. As such, this suggests PE ownership is 
associated with broad-based improvements across a wide range of management practices rather than 
simply just stronger performance incentives
6. 
 
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses measuring management practices 
and the management data, and Section III offers an external validation of the survey tool. In Section 
IV we discuss the distribution of management practices across ownership types, focusing on PE in 
particular. Finally, some concluding comments are offered in Section V.  
 
SECTION II: MEASURING MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
To investigate these issues we first have to construct a robust measure of management practices and 
overcome three hurdles: scoring management practices, collecting accurate responses and obtaining 
interviews with managers. We discuss these issues in turn. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The other ownership groups we consider are dispersed ownership, family-owned (external CEO), managerially owned, 
private individuals, family-owned (family CEO), founder-owned and government-owned. We discuss this in detail below. 
6 Leslie and Oyer [2008] show that PE-owned firms adopt much stronger incentives for their top managers (although this 
does not persist for more than one or two years after they go public).   4
III.A: Scoring management practices 
To measure management requires codifying the concept of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ management into a 
measure applicable to different firms across the manufacturing sector. This is a hard task as good 
management is tough to define, and is often contingent on a firm’s environment. There is no single 
index of good management, but our initial hypothesis is that while some management practices are 
too contingent to be evaluated as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, others can potentially be defined in these terms, and 
it is these practices we tried to focus on in the survey. To do this we used a benchmarking tool 
developed by a leading international management consultancy firm. In order to prevent any 
perception of bias with our study we chose to receive no financial support from this firm.  
 
The practice evaluation tool defines and scores from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best practice) across 18 
key management practices used by industrial firms. These are focused on best practices that can be 
used to increase manufacturing productivity. In Appendix A (Table A1) we detail the practices and 
the type of questions we asked in the same order as they appeared in the survey. In Table A2 we give 
four example practices, the associated questions and scoring system, and three anonymized responses 
per practice. Bloom and Van Reenen [2006] give examples that are more extensive across all 18 
practices.  
 
These practices are grouped into four areas:  
I)  operations (three practices) 
i.  introduction of lean manufacturing techniques  
ii.  documentation of improvements in processes 
iii. rationale behind introduction of improvements 
II)  monitoring (five practices)  
i.  tracking of performance of individuals  
ii.  reviewing performance (e.g. through regular appraisals and job plans)  
iii. performance dialogue (how meetings are structured, what type of feedback occurs)  
iv. consequence management (e.g. making sure that plans are kept and appropriate 
sanctions and rewards are in place) 
v.  performance clarification and comparability 
III)  targets (five practices) 
i.  type of targets (whether goals are simply financial or operational or more holistic)  
ii.  realism of the targets (stretching, unrealistic or non-binding)  
iii. transparency of targets (simple or complex)  
iv. range of targets  
v.  interconnection of targets (e.g. whether they are given consistently throughout the 
organization) 
IV)  incentives (five practices)  
i.  rewarding high-performers (e.g. pay and bonus where best practice is deemed the 
approach that gives strong rewards for those with both ability and effort) 
ii.  removing poor performers (fixing or firing bad performers) 
iii. promotion criteria (e.g. purely tenure-based or including an element linked to 
individual performance)  
iv. attracting human capital  
v.  retaining human capital 
  
A subset of the practices has similarities with those used in studies on human resource management 
practices. 
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Since the scaling may vary across practices in the econometric estimation, we convert the scores 
(from the 1-5 scale) to z-scores by normalizing by practice to mean zero and standard deviation one. 
In our main econometric specifications, we take the unweighted average across all z-scores as our 
primary measure of overall managerial practice, but we also experiment with other weighting schemes 
based on factor analytic approaches. 
 
There is scope for legitimate disagreement over whether all of these measures really constitute ‘good 
practice’. Therefore, an important way to examine the external validity of the measures is to examine 
whether they are correlated with data on firm performance constructed from completely independent 
data sources – company accounts and the stock market. We do this in Section IV, where we show that 
our measures are strongly correlated with measures of (total factor) productivity, profitability, sales 
growth, market-to-book ratios and firm survival. We also investigate whether the measures may be 
culturally biased towards an Anglo-Saxon view of the world. Although this is possible, at least two 
pieces of evidence suggest that the measures are not wholly biased in this manner. First, we show that 
our management scores are correlated with productivity among every regional group – that is, the 
relationship between our measures of management and productivity as derived from an entirely 
separate data source (firm accounts) is as strong (if not stronger) in France and Germany as it is in the 
US or the UK. Second, although the US scores on average the highest on our management measures, 
Britain scores relatively poorly – significantly worse than Japan, Germany or Sweden for example. If 
the measures were fundamentally biased towards English-speaking nations it is unlikely that England 
would score so poorly.  
 
III.B: Collecting accurate responses 
With this evaluation tool, we can provide some quantification of firms’ management practices. 
However, an important issue is the extent to which we can obtain unbiased responses to our questions 
from firms. In particular, will respondents provide accurate responses? As is well known in the 
surveying literature (for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan [2001]) a respondent’s answer to survey 
questions is typically biased by the scoring grid, anchored towards those answers that they suspect the 
interviewer thinks are correct. In addition, interviewers may themselves have preconceptions about 
the performance of the firms they are interviewing and bias their scores based on their ex ante 
perceptions. More generally, a range of background characteristics, potentially correlated with good 
and bad managers, may generate some kinds of systematic bias in the survey data. 
 
To try to address these issues we took a range of steps to obtain accurate data. First, the survey was 
conducted by telephone without telling the managers that they were being scored
7. This enabled 
scoring to be based on the interviewer’s evaluation of the firm’s actual practices, rather than its 
aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or the interviewer’s impressions. To run this ‘blind’ scoring we 
used open questions (for example, “Can you tell me how you promote your employees?”), rather than 
closed questions (for example, “Do you promote your employees on tenure [yes/no]?”). Furthermore, 
these questions target actual practices and examples, with the discussion continuing until the 
interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical practices based on these examples. 
For each practice, the first question is broad with detailed follow-up questions to fine-tune the 
scoring. For example, in dimension (1) Modern manufacturing introduction the initial question is 
                                                 
7 This survey tool has been passed by Stanford Univerity’s Human Subjects Committee. The deception involved was 
deemed acceptable because it is: (i) necessary to get unbiased responses; (ii) minimized to the management practice 
questions and is temporary (we send managers debriefing packs afterwards); and (iii) presents no risk as the data are 
confidential.   6
“Can you tell me about your manufacturing process?” and is followed up by questions such as “How 
do you manage your inventory levels?”.  
 
Second, the interviewers did not know anything about the firm’s financial information or performance 
in advance of the interview. This was achieved by selecting medium-sized manufacturing firms and 
by providing only the names of the firms and their contact details to the interviewers, but no financial 
details. Consequently, the survey tool is ‘double blind’ – managers do not know that they are being 
scored and interviewers do not know about the performance of the firm. The interviewers were 
incentivized on the number of interviews they ran and so had no interest in spending time researching 
the companies in advance of running the interview. These smaller firms (the median size was 675 
employees) would not be known by name and are rarely reported in the business media. The 
interviewers were specially trained graduate students from top European and US business schools. All 
interviews were conducted in the manager’s native language. 
 
Third, each interviewer ran over 50 interviews on average, allowing us to remove interviewer-fixed 
effects from all empirical specifications. This helps to address concerns over inconsistent 
interpretation of categorical responses (see Manski [2004]), standardizing the scoring system. 
 
Fourth, the survey instrument was targeted at plant managers, who are typically senior enough to have 
an overview of management practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations 
of the enterprise.  
 
Fifth, we collected a detailed set of information on the interview process itself (number and type of 
prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, local time of day, date and day of the week); 
on the manager (gender, seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and external 
employment experience and location); and on the interviewer (individual interviewer-fixed effects, 
time of day and subjective reliability score). Some of these survey controls are significantly 
informative about the management score
8 and help reduce residual variation. 
 
III.C: Ensuring international comparability  
In comparing organizational and management surveys across countries we have to be extremely 
careful to ensure comparability of responses. To maximize comparability we undertook three steps. 
First, every interviewer had the same initial three days of interview training, provided jointly by the 
Centre for Economic Performance and our partnering international consultancy firm. This training 
included three role-play calibration exercises, where the group would all score a role-played interview 
and then together discuss the scoring of each question. This was aimed at ensuring every interviewer 
had a common interpretation of the scoring grid. In addition, every Friday afternoon throughout the 
survey period the group met for 90 minutes for training and to discuss any problems with 
interpretation of the survey. 
 
Second, the team operated from one location, the Centre for Economic Performance at the London 
School of Economics (LSE), using two large survey rooms. The different national survey teams were 
                                                 
8 In particular, we found the scores were significantly higher for senior managers, when interviews were conducted later in 
the week and/or earlier in the day. That is to say, scores were highest, on average, for senior managers on a Friday 
morning and lowest for junior managers on a Monday afternoon. By including information on these characteristics in our 
analysis, we explicitly controlled for these types of interview bias.   7
thus listening in on each other’s surveys on a daily basis, were organized and managed in the same 
way, and ran the surveys using exactly the same telephone, computer and software technology
9. 
 
Third, the team interviewed firms in multiple countries. The team language was English, with every 
interviewer able to complete English language interviews, so that interviewers were able to interview 
firms from their own country plus the UK and US. As a result, the median number of countries that 
each interviewer scored was three, enabling us to remove interviewer-fixed effects in the cross-
country analysis. 
 
III.D: Obtaining interviews with managers 
Each interview took on average 50 minutes and was run in the summer of 2006. Overall, we obtained 
a relatively high response rate of 45%, which was achieved through four steps. First, the interview 
was introduced as “a piece of work”
10 without discussion of the firm’s financial position or its 
company accounts, making it relatively uncontroversial for managers to participate. Interviewers did 
not discuss financial information in the interviews, both to maximize the participation of firms and to 
ensure our interviewers were truly ‘blind’ on the firm’s financial position. Second, the survey was 
ordered to lead with the least controversial questions (for example, on shop-floor operations 
management), leading on to monitoring, incentives and organizational structure. Third, interviewers’ 
performance was monitored, as was the proportion of interviews achieved, so they were persistent in 
chasing firms. The questions were also about practices within the firm in order that any plant manager 
could respond, so there were potentially several managers per firm who could be contacted
11. Fourth, 
the written endorsement of many official institutions
12 helped demonstrate to managers that this was 
an important academic exercise with official support. Fifth, the involvement of Cambridge and 
Stanford universities and the LSE, along with the institutions of the interviewers
13, provided a signal 
of the research focus of the work. 
 
III.E: Defining private equity ownership 
For 80% of the firms in our sample, the ownership definition was collected during the survey 
interview. During the interview the manager was asked about the ultimate ownership of the firm. 
Interviewers would then allocate the response to the most appropriate ownership definition from the 
following options: 1) Dispersed shareholders (defined as no one holding more than 25% of the firm's 
equity); 2) Cooperative; 3) Family; 4) Founder; 5) Government; 6) Managers; 7) Private equity or 
venture capital; 8) Private individuals; 9) Other.  
 
                                                 
9 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgJXt8KwhA8 for video footage of the survey team. 
10 We avoided using the words “research” or “survey” as many firms link these to market research surveys, which they 
often refuse to be involved with. 
11 We found no significant correlation between the number, type and timescale of contacts before an interview was 
conducted and the management score. This suggests that while different managers may respond differently to the 
interview proposition this does not appear to be correlated with their responses or the average management practices of the 
firm. 
12 The Banque de France, Bank of Greece, Bank of Japan, Bank of Portugal, Bundesbank, Confederation of Indian 
Industry, European Central Bank, European Commission, Federation of Greek Industries, IUI Sweden, Ministero delle 
Finanze, National Bank of Poland, Peking University, People’s Bank of China, Polish Treasury, Reserve Bank of India, 
Shenzhen Development Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, UK Treasury and Warsaw Stock Exchange 
13 Interviewers were drawn from the following universities: Berkeley, City of London, Columbia, Harvard, HEC School of 
Management, IESE Business School, Imperial, INSEAD, Kellogg, London Business School, LSE, Lund, MIT, Nova de 
Lisbon, Oxford, Stanford and Yale.   8
In order to cross-check the accuracy of this information
14 and to populate the other 20% of the data 
we gathered additional data from manual searches. More specifically, we used the global ultimate 
owner information provided by ORBIS and ZEPHYR, Bureau van Dijk (BVD) datasets specifically 
designed to study firm-level ownership information. For about 30% of the sample, ownership data 
were not available from either ORBIS or ZEPHYR so we also looked at companies’ websites as many 
firms report information on ownership in the ‘about us’ or ‘company history’ sections of their 
websites. If nothing could be found on company websites, we then looked for generic news articles on 
firms using Lexis/Nexis and simple Google searches. This enabled us to collect ownership data for all 
the firms in the database.  
 
There was a problem in the Swedish sample as a large number of firms said that they were owned by 
Wallenberg (called Investor AB). We dropped these from the sample in the main results, but also 
examined what happened if we defined these as PE firms. The results were robust when using this 
definition. 
 
III.F: Sampling frame and additional data 
Since our aim is to compare across countries we decided to focus on the manufacturing sector, where 
productivity is easier to measure than in the non-manufacturing sector. We also focused on medium-
sized firms, selecting a sample of firms with predicted employment of between 100 and 5,000 
workers (with a median of 270). Very small firms have little publicly available data. Very large firms 
are likely to be more heterogeneous across plants, and so it would be more difficult to get a picture of 
organization in the firm as a whole from interviews with one or two plant managers. We drew a 
sampling frame from each country to be representative of medium-sized manufacturing firms and 
then randomly chose the order of which firms to contact (see Appendix B for details). Since we use 
different databases in Europe (Amadeus), the US (Icarus), China and Japan (Oriana) and India 
(Firstsource) we had concerns regarding the cross-country comparisons so we include country 
dummies in all of the preferred specifications. Our choice of countries was determined by economic 
size, data and our ability to hire analysts who were natives of the countries in which interviews were 
being conducted (in order for the interview to be conducted fluently in the same language as the plant 
manager being interviewed). 
 
Comparing the responding firms with those in the sampling frame, we found no evidence that the 
responders were systematically different from the non-responders on any of the performance 
measures. They were also statistically similar on all the other observables in our dataset. The only 
exception was on size and multinational status, where our firms were slightly larger on average than 
those in the sampling frame and slightly more likely to be a multinational subsidiary (see Appendix B 
for details). 
 
We also collected a large amount of additional data from the survey to use as controls. On the human 
resource side, we have information on the proportion of the workforce with degrees, average hours 
worked and the gender and age breakdown of the workforce. In addition, from the sample databases 
we have information on firm size, whether the firm was listed on the stock exchange and standard 
accounting information on sales, capital, etc. 
 
 
                                                 
14 The manager’s statements were almost always correct. 
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SECTION III: VALIDATING THE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
MEASURES 
 
Before we investigate the reasons for the spread of management practices across firms it is worth 
evaluating whether these practices are correlated with firm performance. The purpose of this exercise 
is not to directly identify a causal relationship between our management practice measures and firm 
performance. It is rather an external validity test of the survey measurement tool to check that the 
scores are not just ‘cheap talk’ but are actually correlated with quantitative measures of firm 
performance from independent data sources on company accounts, survival rates and market value.  
 
III.A: Internal data validation: Independent manager and interviewer resurveys 
The data potentially suffer from several types of measurement error that are likely to bias the 
association of firm performance with management towards zero. First, we could have measurement 
error in the management practice scores obtained using our survey tool. To quantify this, we 
performed repeat interviews on 222 firms, contacting different managers in the firm, typically at 
different plants and using different interviewers. To the extent that our management measure is truly 
picking up general company-wide management practices these two scores should be correlated, while 
to the extent the measure is driven by noise the measures should be independent. 
 
The correlation of the first interview against the second interview was strongly positive (a correlation 
coefficient of 0.627 with a p-value of  0.000), and is plotted in Figure 1. Furthermore, there is no 
obvious (or statistically significant) relationship between the difference between the first and second 
interviews and the absolute score. That is to say, high and low scores appear to be as well measured as 
average scores, and firms that have high (or low) scores on the first interview tend to have high (or 
low) scores on the second interview. Thus, firms that score below two or above four appear to be 
genuinely badly or well managed rather than extreme draws of sampling measurement error. 
 
III.B External data validation: Management practices and productivity 
Consider the basic firm ‘production function’:  
 
(1)                              ijc c j ijc ijc ijc n ijc k ijc l ijc u Z MNG m k l y + + + + + + + = θ η γ β α α α '                                            
 
where y = ln(deflated sales) of firm i in (three-digit) industry j in country c. The conventional factor 
inputs are l, ln(labour), k, ln(capital) and m, ln(materials); and in some specifications reported we 
allow country-specific parameters on the inputs. The Zs are a number of other controls that will affect 
productivity, such as workforce characteristics (the proportion of workers with a college degree and 
the average hours worked), firm characteristics (firm age and whether the firm is publicly listed on the 
stock market), a complete set of three-digit industry dummies and country dummies.  
 
The crucial variable for us is management practices denoted MNG. Our basic measure takes z-scores 
of each of the 18 individual management practices and then averages over the variables to proxy 
MNG. We experimented with a number of other approaches, including using the primary factor from 
factor-analysis and using the raw average management scores, and found very similar results.  
 
Table I investigates the association between firm performance and management practices. Column (1) 
simply reports a level OLS specification including only industry, country and time dummies as 
additional controls. The management score is strongly positively and significantly associated with   10
higher labour productivity. The second column includes fixed capital, materials and skills, plus our 
general controls of industry dummies, average hours worked, education, firm age and listing status, 
and a full set of interview ‘noise controls’ to mitigate biases across interviewers and types of 
interviewees. This has little effect on the point estimate on the management term. Overall, the first 
two columns suggest that the average management score is positively and significantly correlated 
with higher productivity.  
 
Columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table I examine three other measures of firm performance. In column (3) 
we use an alternative performance measure, which is return on capital employed (ROCE). The 
significant and positive coefficient on management in the ROCE equation, which also includes the 
same set of controls as in column (2), confirms the basic productivity results. In column (4) we look at 
sales growth and also find a positive and (weakly) significant coefficient. In column (5), we estimate a 
Tobin’s Q specification (the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value), which again 
includes the same set of controls as in the production function. We also find a significant and positive 
coefficient on management. Note that we also find a strong and positive correlation between firm size 
and management practices, which is often used as another measure of firm performance and is 
consistent with the Lucas [1978] model. Survival rates are also higher for better-managed firms (see 
Bloom and Van Reenen [2007]). 
 
We were concerned that the definition of ‘good management’ may be culturally biased towards an 
Anglo-Saxon view of the management world. Some may regard such business practices as suitable for 
Britain and America, but less suitable for Continental Europe. We empirically tested this by 
regressing our preferred productivity equation from column (2) separately for firms from Anglo-
Saxon countries (US and UK, in column (6)), Asian countries (China, India and Japan, in column (7)) 
and Continental European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden in 
column (8)). We found that the management coefficient was positive and significant in all regional 
blocs, which suggests that our concept of good management is not specific to the English-speaking 
world but of more general applicability
15. 
 
Finally, in two other pieces of work we have looked at the relationship between management practices 
and wider ‘social performance’ measures. In  Bloom, Kretschmer and Van Reenen [2006] we 
examined the relationship between management practices and work-life balance in the firm, both in 
terms of subjective employee statements on overall work-life balance and objective measures of the 
ability of employees to work from home, job-share, work part-time and take time off for child care. 
We found that firms that scored more highly on our indicators for management practices also had 
significantly higher subjective and objective employee work-life balance. This is consistent with the 
view that improved management practices do not come at the expense of workers’ welfare (at least in 
the dimension of work-life balance). In Bloom, Genakos, Martin and Sadun [2008] we looked at the 
relationship between management practices and firms’ energy use, finding that well-managed firms 
tended to use less energy in the production process. One obvious explanation is that the adoption of 
modern lean manufacturing techniques enables firms to profitably reduce the energy intensity of their 
production process. 
 
Overall then, there is substantial evidence that the measures of management we use are positively and 
significantly associated with better firm performance across a number of dimensions. These results 
                                                 
15 The coefficients on the factor inputs suggest constant returns to scale in each country, but with different factor 
intensities. Material inputs are not available for UK and US companies.    11
also offer some external validation of the survey tool, implying that we are not simply measuring 
statistical noise. 
 
SECTION IV: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN PRIVATE EQUITY 
FIRMS 
 
IV.A: Overall management practices 
We start by investigating the relationship between private equity ownership and management 
practices. To do this we have allocated firms into several ownership groups according to the type of 
their single-largest shareholding block. In Figure 2 we show the average management score by these 
ownership groups, while in Table I we show these results in statistical form after adding a variety of 
controls. 
  
Looking first at Figure 2, three main results stand out from the raw data. First, PE-owned firms 
received the highest management scores on average. Second, dispersed ownership firms (those with 
no ownership block above 25%, often publicly quoted) are almost as well run as PE-owned firms. 
Third, government-owned firms, family-owned firms with a family CEO
16, founder-owned firms (the 
individual who set up the company) and companies owned by private individuals are notably more 
poorly managed than PE-owned firms.  
 
Table II column (1) reports these differences alongside standard errors, produced by regressing 
management practices on ownership dummies with the PE ownership category as the omitted 
category. This shows that the difference between PE-owned firms and dispersed ownership firms are 
small in magnitude and not statistically significant. On the other hand, the difference between PE-
owned firms and government-, founder- and family-owned and family-CEO firms is highly 
significant. In column (2) we add country dummies, because many PE firms are in more developed 
countries (US, UK and Sweden) while many government-owned and family-owned firms are in 
developing countries. Controlling for country of location reduces the gaps between the ownership 
types, but leaves the qualitative results broadly unchanged. In columns (3) and (4) we add in 
subsequent controls for three-digit industry dummies, firm size, worker skills, hours and a survey 
noise, and again find the results are broadly robust. 
 
Figure 2 also contains information on management practices based on the current owner (dark 
shading) and based on the ownership if this has been continuous for the last three years (light 
shading). We see that among firms with stable ownership over the last three years PE-owned firms 
appear to have a slightly better average management score. This suggests that PE ownership is 
associated with relatively better management practices after a longer period of ownership. This is 
presumably because firms recently acquired by PE firms may be badly managed, if they are selected 
on their potential for performance improvement. We investigate this selection issue in more detail in 
sub-section IV.D below by examining the subset of our data where we have longitudinal information 




                                                 
16 Family-owned firms that appoint an external CEO appear to be well managed, suggesting that it is merit-based 
appointment of senior managers which matters more than family ownership per se.    12
IV.B Consistency of management practices across ownership types 
Figure 3 plots the management practice histogram across firms by ownership category (in solid 
shading). Overlaid on this is the kernel density plot
17 for PE-owned firms (dashed line), to facilitate a 
comparison between the distribution of firms’ management practices other ownership categories. This 
shows that PE-owned firms have better management practices on average than government-, founder-, 
family-, family-CEO, and privately owned firms because of the lack of a tail of badly managed firms. 
For example, out of the 137 PE-owned firms in the sample only one has a management score of less 
than 2 while government-, founder- and family-owned and family-CEO firms all have more than 15% 
of their management scores less than 2. By contrast, dispersed shareholder firms have a very similar 
distribution of scores to PE-owned firms. 
 
IV.C: Types of management practices 
We also investigate in Table III to what extent the difference between PE-owned and other firms is 
due to particular types of management practices. This reports the results from regressing the average 
management scores for the four subgroups of management practices outlined in Section II.A – 
operations management, monitoring, targets and incentives – against a PE ownership dummy, with all 
other firms as the baseline group. Each one of the four management practice subgroups was 
normalized to have a standard deviation to unity. Therefore, the coefficient on the private equity 
dummy in each column reports how many standard deviations PE firms are different from all other 
firms on that management practice.  
 
In column (1) of Table III we report the results for operations management (lean manufacturing and 
continuous improvement) and find PE-owned firms are significantly better-managed on this 
dimension than other types of firms. In column (2) we add controls for country, industry, firm and 
noise and find that PE firms are still significantly better than other firms on operations management. 
Columns (3) to (8) repeat similar estimations of the difference between PE-owned and others on 
monitoring, targets and incentives management with and without other controls. Interestingly, we find 
that while PE-owned firms are significantly better than non-PE-owned firms on all types of 
management practices, this is notably so on operations and monitoring practices.  
 
In Table IV we look at the differential between PE-owned firms and all other firms on all 18 of the 
individual management practices. What we find is that PE-owned firms are substantially better at the 
adoption of modern lean manufacturing techniques, and at process documentation, review and 
tracking. Interestingly, the other area where they are notable better than other firms is in removing 
poor performers, suggesting that they are more willing to retrain or exit underperforming employees. 
 
IV.D: Changes in management practices over time 
We followed the 732 firms interviewed in 2004 in Bloom and Van Reenen [2007] through to 2006. 
We were able to collect information on 561 of these firms and can observe how our management 
measure evolves over time. Fifty-six of these firms had some change in ownership over these two 
years so we can examine changes in practices among firms who stayed in the same ownership type 
and in those who changed. Figure 4 plots out the change in the management index by ownership type. 
The bottom bar shows that firms which remained in private equity hands for at least three years had 
the fastest improvement of management practices of all the different ownership types. By contrast, the 
firms whose management performance was deteriorating were more likely to be taken over by private 
equity (second from bottom bar).  
 
                                                 
17 The kernel is estimated using an Epanechnikov smoother over a bandwidth of 100 firms.    13
The obvious interpretation of this graph is that PE disproportionately targets firms whose 
management is underperforming and are then better at improving them. Although this is consistent 
with anecdotal evidence, an important caveat is that we do not have a long period after the PE 
takeover so we cannot be sure of this interpretation. Furthermore, some of the cell sizes are very small 
– we only have nine firms who remained PE-owned for three years or more, for example.  
 
With these caveats in mind, Figure 4 reinforces the point in Figure 2 that we may be underestimating 
the benefits of PE ownership by simply looking at the cross-sectional correlations. The fact that PE 
seem to target underperforming firms means that there will be a downward bias to the cross-sectional 
regressions in Tables II through IV (which may be why PE-owned firms appear no better than those 
with dispersed ownership patterns). 
 
A final reason why we may be underestimating some of the benefits of PE ownership is that we are 
mixing all types of very heterogeneous acquiring PE firms together. It may be that the larger and more 
prestigious PE firms are much better at improving firm performance. To investigate this we identified 
the names of the PE firms who owned the firms in our sample and examined whether these ‘top tier’ 
PE firms were different
18. Unfortunately, we were unable to detect significant differences between 
these types of firms, which was probably related to the small sample size of PE-owned firms (there 
are only 137 in our sample). 
SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using a new survey tool we collect management practice and ownership data from over 4,000 
medium-sized manufacturing firms across Asia, Europe and the US. We find three broad sets of 
results. 
 
First, PE-owned firms are on average the best-managed ownership group in the sample. PE-owned 
firms are significantly better managed than government-owned, family-owned and privately owned 
firms. This is true even after controlling for a range of other firm characteristics such as country, 
industry, size and employee skills. However, the difference in management practice scores between 
PE-owned and dispersed shareholding firms (including publicly quoted firms) is small and 
insignificant. Second, the reason for the high average levels of management practices in PE-owned 
firms is the lack of any tail of badly managed firms under their ownership. While government-owned, 
family-owned and privately owned firms have substantial tails of badly managed firms, those owned 
by Private Equity are all consistently well managed. Finally, PE-owned firms are particularly strong at 
operations management practices, such as the adoption of modern lean manufacturing practices, using 
continuous improvements and a comprehensive performance documentation process. As such, this 
suggests PE ownership is associated with broad-based improvements across a wide range of 
management practices rather than simply just stronger performance incentives. 
 
One limitation of our study is that it is mainly cross-sectional, so we cannot determine the causal 
effect of PE ownership on management practices and performance as we do not have a sufficiently 
long panel or an instrumental variable for PE ownership. Nevertheless, we do find evidence 
suggesting that we may be underestimating the positive effects of PE ownership. Using a small panel 
                                                 
18 We used the ‘top 15’ PE firms from the website http://www.peimedia.com/pei50. Results are similar when using the 
top 10 or 5. 
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of changes in management practices, we find that PE-owned firms have the fastest improvement in 
management. This is partly disguised because acquiring PE firms also seem to select underperforming 
firms, which they then subsequently help turn around. 
 
A second limitation is that our measures of management practice are coarse and cannot capture all of 
the nuances of management style and strategy. Having some quantitative cross-national measures that 
can be used across a range of industries is, in our view, an important advantage of this study. These 
practice measures are complementary to (and strongly correlated with) other measures of firm 
performance such as productivity. The findings reported here are the first for PE ownership and 
management practices so are an initial step in a longer-term research programme.  
   15
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TABLE I: Management practices and firm performance 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Firms All  All  All  All  Quoted  US and 





Ln (Y) it 
Sales 









Ln (Y) it 
Sales 
Ln (Y) it 
Sales 
Ln (Y) it 
Sales 
      
Management  
z-score 
0.616*** 0.192***  0.982**  0.007*  0.223***  0.169***  0.474**  0.203*** 
(0.038) (0.021)  (0.438)  (0.004)  (0.079) (0.033)  (0.187)  (0.027) 
Ln (L) it   0.626***  1.035***  -0.007 0.097  0.750***  0.239**  0.584*** 
Labour   (0.029)  (0.327)  (0.004)  (0.075)  (0.033)  (0.093)  (0.044) 
Ln (K) it   0.255***  -1.126***  0.007**  -0.096  0.201***  0.493***  0.233*** 
Capital   (0.017)  (0.226)  (0.003)  (0.066)  (0.025)  (0.049)  (0.023) 
Ln (N) it   0.205***  0.212  0.018***  -0.057    0.240**  0.251*** 
Materials   (0.015)  (0.243)  (0.003)  (0.053)    (0.113)  (0.019) 
ln (H) it,   0.057***  0.166  0.000  0.103***  0.043***  -0.015  0.055*** 
% employees with a 
degree 
 (0.010)  (0.202)  (0.002)  (0.036)  (0.013)  (0.045)  (0.013) 
Country, time and 
industry dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Firm controls  NO  YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES
Noise controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Firms  3,278 3,278  2,432  2,953  327  1,058  615  1,605 
Observations  13,922 13,922  11,656  12,948  1,561  4,691  914  8,317 
 
NOTES: ***denotes that a coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level and * at the 0.10 level. All columns estimated by OLS. In 
all columns standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates and allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (i.e. 
clustered by firm). ‘Firm controls’ comprise of firm-level controls for ln(average hours worked), ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed and the 
share of the workforce with degrees. ‘Noise controls’ are 48 interviewer dummies, the seniority, gender, tenure and number of countries worked in 
of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, the duration of the 
interviews and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Accounting data span 2001 to 2006. All regressions 
include a full set of three-digit industry dummies and 11 country dummies. Materials data were not directly available for the UK and US so we 
could not include this variable in the regressions of column (6). In other columns (1)-(5) we include a dummy variable for when materials data are 
missing. 
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TABLE II: Ownership types and management practices 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 








PE-owned  Baseline Baseline  Baseline  Baseline 
Dispersed shareholders  -0.044 -0.003  -0.011  -0.042 
 (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.042) (0.039) 
Family-owned, external CEO  -0.094 -0.071  -0.058  -0.121** 
  (0.060) (0.059)  (0.059) (0.052) 
Managers  -0.179*** -0.143**  -0.126*  -0.099* 
  (0.065) (0.065)  (0.067) (0.059) 
Private individuals  -0.348*** -0.249***  -0.239***  -0.169*** 
  (0.045) (0.046)  (0.046) (0.042) 
Family-owned, family CEO  -0.482*** -0.414***  -0.384***  -0.281*** 
  (0.045) (0.046)  (0.046) (0.043) 
Founder ownership  -0.573*** -0.403***  -0.381***  -0.267*** 
  (0.046) (0.047)  (0.048) (0.044) 
Government ownership  -0.633*** -0.401***  -0.393***  -0.378*** 
  (0.061) (0.061)  (0.061) (0.056) 
Other   -0.204*** -0.131*** -0.127** -0.136*** 
  (0.050) (0.051)  (0.051) (0.046) 
Country controls  NO YES  YES  YES 
Industry controls  NO NO  YES  YES 
Firm and noise controls  NO NO  NO  YES 
Firms  4,081  4,081  4,081  4,081 
 
NOTES: *** denotes that a coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level and * at the 0.10 level. All columns estimated by 
OLS. In all columns robust standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates. ‘Firm controls’ are comprised of firm-level 
controls for ln(average hours worked), ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed and the share of the workforce with degrees. ‘Noise controls’ 
are 48 interviewer dummies; the seniority, gender, tenure and number of countries worked in of the manager who responded; the day of the 
week the interview was conducted; the time of day the interview was conducted; the duration of the interviews; and an indicator of the 
reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. 
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TABLE III: Management practice types and private equity ownership 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent 
variable:  Operations Operations Monitoring Monitoring  Targets Targets Incentives  Incentives 
PE-owned   0.454*** 0.163** 0.482*** 0.239***  0.398***  0.138**  0.196*** 0.108 
  (0.074) (0.078) (0.067) (0.067)  (0.074) (0.069)  (0.074) (0.069) 
Country 
controls  NO YES NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Industry 
controls  NO YES NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Firm and noise 
controls  NO YES NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Firms  NO YES NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Observations  4,081  4,081  4,081  4,081  4,081  4,081  4,081  4,081 
 
NOTES: *** denotes that a coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level and * at the 0.10 level. All columns estimated by OLS. 
Columns (1) and (2) dependent variable is operations management (Table A1 questions 1, 2 and 3), columns (3) and (4) dependent variable is 
monitoring (Table A1 questions 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12), columns (5) and (6) dependent variable is targets (Table A1 questions 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13), 
while columns (7) and (8) dependent variable is incentives (Table A1 questions 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18). The management dependent variables in 
each column have been normalized to have a standard deviation of unity. In all columns robust standard errors are in parentheses under 
coefficient estimates. ‘Firm controls’ are comprised of firm-level controls for ln(average hours worked), ln(firm age), a dummy for being listed 
and the share of the workforce with degrees. ‘Noise controls’ are 48 interviewer dummies; the seniority, gender, tenure and number of countries 
worked in of the manager who responded; the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted; the 
duration of the interviews; and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer.   20
TABLE IV: Individual management practices and private equity ownership 
 




Average value for private equity 
(Point estimate) 
Modern manufacturing, 
introduction  1 Operations  0.129 
  (0.085) 
Modern manufacturing, rationale  2O perations 0.069 
  (0.080) 
Process documentation  3O perations 0.219*** 
  (0.076) 
Performance tracking  4 Monitoring 0.231*** 
  (0.071) 
Performance review  5 Monitoring 0.191*** 
   (0.072) 
Performance dialogue  6  Monitoring 0.261*** 
   (0.078) 
Consequence management  7  Monitoring 0.138* 
     (0.072) 
Target breadth  8 Targets  0.128* 
     (0.074) 
Target interconnection  9 Targets  0.105 
     (0.076) 
Target time horizon  10 Targets  0.141* 
     (0.083) 
Targets are stretching  11 Targets  0.100 
   (0.074) 
Performance clarity and 
comparability  12  Monitoring  0.056 
     (0.080) 
Managing human capital  13 Targets  0.026 
     (0.083) 
Rewarding high performance  14 Incentives  0.036 
     (0.080) 
Removing poor performers  15 Incentives  0.142** 
     (0.070) 
Promoting high-performers  16 Incentives  0.057 
     (0.088) 
Attracting human capital  17 Incentives  0.020 
     (0.073) 
Retaining human capital  18 Incentives  0.092 
     (0.085) 
NOTES: Each row shows the point estimate (standard error) from regressing the z-score for that practice against a private equity 
ownership dummy in the sample of 4,081 firms with complete management practice data. The practice z-score is the score outlined in 
Appendix A below, normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. *** denotes that the variable is significant at the 
1% level, ** denotes 5% significance and * denotes 10% significance. Estimation by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Controls are the same as in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table III, so include country dummies, industry dummies, firm and plant 
size, and noise controls. Noise controls include the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the 
manager’s seniority and tenure, the duration of the interview, and four dummies for missing values in seniority, tenure, duration and 
reliability.  21
APPENDIX A: DETAILS OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
TABLE A1: Full list of management practices with examples of the questions asked 
 
Practice  Practice 
number 
Practice type  Example of questions we asked 
      
Modern manufacturing, introduction  1 Operations  a)  Can you describe the production process for me? 
b)  What kinds of lean (modern) manufacturing processes have you 
introduced? Can you give me specific examples? 
c)  How do you manage inventory levels? What is done to balance the line?  
 
Modern manufacturing, rationale  2 Operations  a)  Can you take me through the rationale to introduce these processes? 
b)  What factors led to the adoption of these lean (modern) management 
practices? 
 
Process documentation  3 Operations  a)  How would you go about improving the manufacturing process itself? 
b)  How do problems typically get exposed and fixed? 
c)  Talk me through the process for a recent problem. 
d)  Do the staff ever suggest process improvements? 
 
Performance tracking  4 Monitoring  a)  Tell me how you track production performance? 
b)  What kind of key performance indicators (KPIs) would you use for 
performance tracking? How frequently are these measured? Who gets to 
see this KPI data? 
c)  If I were to walk through your factory could I tell how you were doing 
against your KPIs? 
 
Performance review  5 Monitoring  a)  How do you review your key performance indicators (KPIs)? 
b)  Tell me about a recent meeting. Who is involved in these meetings? 
c)  Who gets to see the results of this review? 
 
Performance dialogue  6 Monitoring  a)  How are these meetings structured? Tell me about your most recent 
meeting. 
b)  During these meetings, how much useful data do you have? 
c)  How useful do you find problem-solving meetings? 
d)  What type of feedback occurs in these meetings?  22
 
Consequence management  7 Monitoring  a)  What happens if there is a part of the business (or a manager) who isn’t 
achieving agreed-upon results? Can you give me a recent example? 
b)  What kind of consequences would follow such an action? 
c)  Are there any parts of the business (or managers) that seem to repeatedly 
fail to carry out agreed actions? 
 
Target breadth  8 Targets  a)  What types of targets are set for the company? What are the goals for your 
plant? 
b)  Tell me about the financial and non-financial goals. 
c)  What do company headquarters (CHQ) or its appropriate manager 
emphasize to you? 
 
Target interconnection  9 Targets  a)  What is the motivation behind your goals? 
b)  How are these goals cascaded down to the individual workers? 
c)  What are the goals of the top management team (do they even know what 
they are!)? 
d)  How are your targets linked to company performance and its goals? 
 
Target time horizon  10 Targets  a)  What kind of timescale are you looking at with your targets? 
b)  How are long-term goals linked to short-term goals? 
c)  Could you meet all your short-term goals but miss your long-term goals? 
 
Targets are stretching  11 Targets  a)  How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them? 
b)  On average, how often would you say that you meet your targets? 
c)  Are there any targets which are obviously too easy (will always be met) or 
too hard (will never be met)? 
d)  Do you feel that on targets that all groups receive the same degree of 
difficulty? Do some groups get easy targets? 
 
Performance clarity and comparability  12 Monitoring  a)  What are your targets (i.e. do they know them exactly)? Tell me about 
them in full. 
b)  Does everyone know their targets? Does anyone complain that the targets 
are too complex? 
c)  How do people know about their own performance compared with other 
people’s performance? 
 
Managing human capital  13 Targets  a)  Do senior managers discuss attracting and developing talented people? 
b)  Do senior managers get any rewards for bringing in and keeping talented 
        people in the company? 
c)  Can you tell me about the talented people you have developed within your   23
team? Did you get any rewards for this? 
 
Rewarding high performance  14 Incentives  a)  How does your appraisal system work? Tell me about the most recent 
round. 
b)  How does the bonus system work? 
c)  Are there any non-financial rewards for top performers? 
Removing poor performers  15 Incentives  a)  If you had a worker who could not do his job what would you do? Could 
you give me a recent example? 
b)  How long would underperformance be tolerated? 
c)  Do you find any workers who lead a sort of charmed life? Do some 
individuals always just manage to avoid being fixed/fired? 
 
Promoting high-performers  16 Incentives  a)  Can you rise up the company rapidly if you are really good? Are there any 
examples you can think of? 
b)  What about poor performers – do they get promoted more slowly? Are 
there any examples you can think of? 
c)  How would you identify and develop (i.e. train) your star performers? 
d)  If two people both joined the company five years ago and one was much 
better than the other would he/she be promoted faster? 
 
Attracting human capital  17 Incentives  a)  What makes it distinctive to work at your company as opposed to your 
competitors? 
b)  If you were trying to sell your firm to me how would you do this (get them 
to try to do this)? 
c)  What don’t people like about working in your firm? 
 
Retaining human capital  18 Incentives  a)  If you had a star performer who wanted to leave what would the company 
do?  
b)  Could you give me an example of a star performer being persuaded to stay 
after wanting to leave? 
c)  Could you give me an example of a star performer who left the company 
without anyone trying to keep them? 
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TABLE A2: Management practice interview guide and example responses for 4 of the 18 practices  
 
Any score from 1 to 5 can be given, but the scoring guide and examples are only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5. Multiple questions are 
used for each dimension to improve scoring accuracy. 
 
Practice 3: Process problem documentation (Operations) 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: No, process improvements are made when 
problems occur. 
Improvements are made in weekly 
workshops involving all staff, to improve 
performance in their area of the plant. 
Exposing problems in a structured way is integral to 
individuals’ responsibilities and resolution occurs as a 
part of normal business processes rather than by 
extraordinary effort/teams. 
 Examples:  A US firm has no formal or informal 
mechanism in place for either process 
documentation or improvement. The 
manager admitted that production takes 
place in an environment where nothing has 
been done to encourage or support process 
innovation. 
A US firm takes suggestions via an 
anonymous box, they then review these each 
week in their section meeting and decide any 
that they would like to proceed with. 
The employees of a German firm constantly analyse the 
production process as part of their normal duty. They 
film critical production steps to analyse areas more 
thoroughly. Every problem is registered in a special 
database that monitors critical processes and each issue 
must be reviewed and signed off by a manager. 
 
Practice 4: Performance tracking (Monitoring) 
 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Measures tracked do not indicate directly if 
overall business objectives are being met. 
Tracking is an ad-hoc process (certain 
processes are not tracked at all). 
 
Most key performance indicators are tracked 
formally. Tracking is overseen by senior 
management.  
Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, 
both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of 
visual management tools. 
  Examples:  A manager of a US firm tracks a range of 
measures when he does not think that 
output is sufficient. He last requested these 
reports about eight months ago and had 
them printed for a week until output 
increased again. Then he stopped and has 
not requested anything since.  
At a US firm every product is bar-coded and 
performance indicators are tracked 
throughout the production process; however, 
this information is not communicated to 
workers. 
A US firm has screens in view of every line. These 
screens are used to display progress to daily target and 
other performance indicators. The manager meets with 
the shop floor every morning to discuss the day past and 
the one ahead and uses monthly company meetings to 
present a larger view of the goals to date and strategic 
direction of the business to employees. He even stamps 
napkins with key performance achievements to ensure 




Practice 11: Targets are stretching (Targets) 
 
  
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  Goals are either too easy or impossible to 
achieve; managers provide low estimates to 
ensure easy goals. 
In most areas, top management pushes for 
aggressive goals based on solid economic 
rationale. There are a few ‘sacred cows’ that 
are not held to the same rigorous standard. 
 
Goals are genuinely demanding for all divisions. They 
are grounded in solid economic rationale. 
  Examples:  A French firm uses easy targets to improve 
staff morale and encourage people. They 
find it difficult to set harder goals because 
people just give up and managers refuse to 
work people harder. 
A chemicals firm has two divisions, 
producing special chemicals for very 
different markets (military, civil). Easier 
levels of targets are requested from the 
founding and more prestigious military 
division.  
A manager of a UK firm insisted that he has to set 
aggressive and demanding goals for everyone – even 
security. If they hit all their targets he worries he has not 
stretched them enough. Each KPI is linked to the overall 
business plan. 
 
Practice 16: Promoting high-performers (Incentives) 
 
  
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
 Scoring  grid: People are promoted primarily on the basis 
of tenure.  
People are promoted on the basis of 
performance. 
We actively identify, develop and promote our top 
performers.  
 
 Examples:  A UK firm promotes based on an 
individual’s commitment to the company, 
measured by experience. Hence, almost all 
employees move up the firm in lock-step. 
Management was afraid to change this 
process because it would create bad feeling 
among the older employees who were 
resistant to change. 
A US firm has no formal training 
programme. People learn on the job and are 
promoted based on their performance on the 
job. 
At a UK firm each employee is given a red light (not 
performing), amber light (doing well and meeting 
targets), a green light (consistently meeting targets/very 
high performer) and a blue light (high-performer capable 
of promotion of up to two levels). Each manager is 
assessed every quarter based on his succession plans and 
development plans for individuals. 
 
NOTE: The full set of scoring and examples can be found in Bloom and Van Reenen [2006]   26
APPENDIX B: DATA 
 
B.1: Survey data 
 
The survey sampling frame 
Our sampling frame was based on the BVD Amadeus dataset for Europe (France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK); on BVD Icarus for the US, on Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE) Firstsource dataset for India, and on the BVD Oriana dataset for China 
and Japan. These databases all provide sufficient information on companies to conduct a stratified 
telephone survey (company name, address and a size indicator). These databases also typically 
have some accounting information, such as employment, sales of capital assets, etc. However, 
apart from size, we did not insist on having accounting information to form the sampling 
population. 
 
Amadeus and Firstsource are constructed from a range of sources, primarily the national registries 
of companies (such as Companies House in the UK and the Registry of Companies in India). 
Icarus is constructed from the Dun & Bradstreet database, which is a private database of over 5 
million US trading locations built up from credit records, business telephone directories and direct 
research. Oriana is constructed from the databases of Huaxia Credit in China and Teikoku 
Databank in Japan, covering all public and private firms with one of the following: 150 or more 
employees, US$ 10 million of sales or US$ 20 million of assets. 
 
In every country the sampling frame was all firms with a manufacturing primary industry code and 
between 100 and 5,000 employees on average over the most recent three years of data (typically 
2002 to 2004)
19. In Japan and China we used all manufacturing firms with 150 to 5,000 employees 
since Oriana only samples firms with over 150 employees
20. In Portugal, the population of firms 
with 100 to 5,000 employees was only 242, so we supplemented this with the 72 firms with 75 to 
100 employees. We checked the results by conditioning on common size bands (above 150 in all 
countries). Interviewers were each given a randomly selected list of firms from the sampling 
frame, which further analysis in Bloom, Genakos, Martin and Sadun [2008] confirms.  
 
In addition to randomly surveying from the sampling frame described above we also tried to 
resurvey the firms we interviewed in the 2004 survey wave used in Bloom and Van Reenen 
[2007]. This was a sample of 732 firms from France, Germany, the UK and the US, with a 
manufacturing primary industry code and 50 to 10,000 employees (on average during the period 
2000 to 2003). This sample was drawn from the Amadeus dataset for Europe and Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat dataset for the US. Only companies with accounting data were selected. 
Therefore, for the UK and France this sampling frame was very similar to the 2006 sampling 
frame. For Germany, it is more heavily skewed towards publicly quoted firms since smaller 
privately held firms do not report balance sheet information. For the US, it comprised only 
                                                 
19 In the US only the most recent year of employment is provided. In India employment is not reported for private 
firms, so for these companies we used forecast employment, predicted from their total assets (which are reported) 
using the coefficients from regressing log (employees) on log (assets) for public firms. 
20 Note that the Oriana database does include firms with less than 150 employees if they meet the sales or assets 
criteria, but we excluded this to avoid using a selected sample.   27
publicly quoted firms. As a result, when we present results we always include controls for firm 
size. As a robustness test we drop the firms that were resurveyed from 2004. These resurveyed 
firms were randomly distributed among the relevant country interviewers. 
 
The survey response rate 
Of the firms we contacted 44.9% took part in the survey: a high success rate given the voluntary 
nature of participation. Of the remaining firms, 16.8% refused to be surveyed and the remaining 
38.3% were in the process of being scheduled when the survey ended. The reason for this high 
share of ‘scheduling in progress’ firms was the need for interviewers to keep a portfolio of firms 
that they cycle through when trying to set up interviews. Since interviewers only ran an average of 
2.8 interviews a day the majority of their time was spent trying to contact managers to schedule 
future interviews. For scheduling it was efficient for interviewers to keep a stock of between 100 
and 500 firms to cycle through. The optimal level of this stock varied by country – in the US and 
UK many managers operated voicemail, so large stocks of firms were needed. In Japan, after two 
weeks the team switched from working Japanese hours (midnight to 08.00) to Japanese afternoons 
and UK mornings (04.00 till midday), which left large stocks of contacted firms in Japan
21. In 
Continental Europe, in contrast, managers typically had personal assistants rather than voicemail, 
who wanted to see government endorsement materials before connecting interviewers with the 
managers, and therefore each approach was more time-consuming, requiring a smaller stock of 
firms. 
 
The ratio of successful interviews to rejections (ignoring ‘scheduling in progress’) is above 1 in 
every country. Hence, managers typically agreed to the survey proposition when interviewers were 
able to connect with them. This agreement ratio is lowest in China and Japan. There were two 
reasons for this: first, the Chinese and Japanese firms did appear to be genuinely more likely to 
refuse to be interviewed; and second, time zone differences meant that our interviewers could not 
call during the Chinese or Japanese morning, which sometimes led to rejections if managers were 
too busy to talk in the afternoon. 
 
We also find (detailed in Bloom, Genakos, Martin and Sadun [2008]) that the decision to accept 
the interview proposition is uncorrelated with revenues per worker, listing status of the firm or 
firm age. Large firms and multinationals did appear to be more predisposed to accepting the 
interview proposition, although the size of this effect is not large – multinationals were about 
seven percentage points more likely to agree to the interview, and firms about four percentage 
points more likely for each doubling in size. The likelihood of managers accepting the interview 
proposition did not rise significantly through the survey. Finally, compared with the US only four 
countries had a significantly higher conditional acceptance rate – France, Greece, Italy and Poland 
– while none had a significantly lower acceptance rate. 
 
B.2: Firm-level data 
Our firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term 
debt, market values (for quoted firms) and wages (where available) came from the BVD Amadeus 
                                                 
21 After two weeks of the Japanese team working midnight to 08.00 it became clear this schedule was not sustainable 
due to the unsociability of the hours, with one of the Japanese interviewers resigning. The rest of the team then 
switched to working 04.00 until noon.    28
dataset for Europe (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK), the BVD Icarus 
dataset for the US, the CMIE Firstsource dataset for India, and the BVD Oriana dataset for China 
and Japan. 
 
B.3: Industries and industry-level data 
Our basic industry code is the US Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 1997 three-digit level – 
which is our common industry definition in every country. We allocate each firm to its main three-
digit sector (based on sales). For the 3,601 firms in the sample we have 134 unique three-digit 
industries. There are at least 10 sampled firms in each industry for 96.9% of the sample. 
 
Profits are defined as EBIT (earnings before interest and taxation) to include the costs of labour, 
materials and capital but excluding any financing or tax costs. The five-year period 2000 to 2004 
is used in every country to ensure comparability across countries (since earlier data are not 
available in Oriana). In the US and India private firms do not provide profits data so the index was 
constructed from the population of all publicly listed firms, obtained from Compustat for the US 
and the CMIE Prowess dataset for India. 
 
B.4: Data descriptive statistics 
A set of descriptive statistics broken down by country is in Table B1. We have 3,902 firms with 
4,038 observations, since 136 firms were interviewed twice. There are also a few missing values 
for some control variables (for example, the percentage of employees with a degree). In these 
cases we set the value of the control variable equal to zero when it was missing and include an 
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TABLE B1: The survey sample descriptive statistics 
 
                 
  All CN  FR  GE  GR  IN IT JP PO  PT  SW  UK  US  Missing, 
# 
Observations, #  4,038  325 323 348 187 470 204 122 239 177 286 649 694  n/a 




   242  225          560  535  n/a 
Firm employees 
(median) 




   200  325          250  300  n/a 
Plant employees 
(median)  150 500 150 225 120 150 150 150 150 125 150 140 150  0 
Production sites 
(median), #  2 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 3  94 
Age of firm 
(median, years)  34 12 39 40 32 22 33 57 31 35 62 34 33  101 




17.3  8  17.3 14.9 11.9 22.0 16.3 30.9 20.0  9.6  19.8 12.9 20.1  436 
Management 
(mean)   2.99 2.61 2.99 3.18 2.64 2.54 3.00 3.15 2.88 2.73 3.15 3.00 3.31  0 
Trust (%)  38 65 17 33 15 39 40 43 31 16 72 36 42  48 
1-Lerner index  .957 .950 .965 .949 .935 .923 .965 .966 .967 .972 .980 .968 .940  111 
% of foreign 
MNEs  0.25 0.20 0.46 0.31 0.19 0.10 0.25 0.03 0.35 0.18 0.44 0.38 0.14  0 
% of domestic 




47.9 48.6 46.3 44.7 49.8 59.8 46.6 58.4 47.8 54.5 56.3 43.5 46.8  34 
Notes: All=All countries combined, CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, 
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1 Notes: The figure plots the management score from the first interview on a firm against the second interview on the firm. These two interviews are 
undertaken independently – so both the interviewer and interviewee are different across two interviews. There are 222 interview pairs plotted here.
Management score in the first interviewFigure 2: Private equity owned firms have the best 
raw management practice scores on average
Government



















2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3 3.25 3.5
Note: Sample of 4,221 medium-sized manufacturing firms. The bottom bar-chart only covers the 3696 firms which have been in the same ownership for the 
last 3 years. The “Other” category includes venture capital, joint-ventures, charitable foundations and unknown ownership.Figure 3: Private equity owned firms high average  
scores reflect their small tail of badly managed firms
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Note: Sample of 4,221 medium-sized manufacturing firms.Figure 4: Private Equity firms have greater 
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